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The assumption of free will – the ability of an experimentalist to make random choices – is central
to proving the indeterminism of quantum resources, the primary tool in quantum cryptography.
Relaxing the assumption in a Bell test allows violation of the usual classical threshold by correlating
the random number generators used to select measurements with the devices that perform them. In
this paper, we examine not only these correlations, but those across multiple runs of the experiment.
This enables an explicit exposition of the optimal cheating strategy and how the correlations manifest
themselves within this strategy. Similar to other recent results, we prove that there remain Bell
violations for a sufficiently high, yet non-maximal degree of free will which cannot be simulated by
a classical attack, regardless of how many runs of the experiment those choices are correlated over.
I. INTRODUCTION
Bell’s theorem [1] provides an experimentally falsifiable
prediction for certain correlations if Nature is determinis-
tic. That these inequalities are found to be violated [2, 3]
constitutes proof of the incompatibility of classical, de-
terministic or stochastic, theories with the Universe, no
matter that our knowledge of theories compatible with
Nature may be incomplete. A definitive Bell test, free of
loopholes, is yet to be realised. Nevertheless, the over-
whelming consensus is that the correlations predicted by
quantum theory have been verified since the common
loopholes of locality [1] and detection [4] have been closed
separately [5, 6], and Nature would be strange indeed if
it conspired to utilise whichever loophole were available
in order to mask its classicality.
This violation of a Bell inequality as a proof technique
has since been elevated to the central tool in proving the
absence of an eavesdropper [7], being so powerful as to
secure cryptographic schemes that need not be reliant on
either the quantum theory that inspired them [8] or com-
plete knowledge of the devices used to implement them
[9]. This device-independent cryptography seeks security
even when the users’ devices are assumed to be controlled
by an adversary, for tasks such as key distribution (see
[9] and references therein) or randomness expansion [10].
However, this also elevates the stringent requirements of
loophole closure; an adversary will certainly conspire to
use every tool available to mask the classicality induced
by their eavesdropping. This includes subverting not only
the detectors and any locality weaknesses, but also cor-
rupting any other tools the cryptographers might import
into their laboratory, such as random number generators
(RNGs). This corruption must be quite specific, since the
choices of input to the Bell test made by the RNGs should
still give the experimenters, ignorant of any adversarial
involvement, the impression of perfect randomness.
Such corruption necessitates the study of ‘free will’
loopholes [11–15] in which the random numbers are not
perfectly random, and an eavesdropper can use that
knowledge to modify her strategy. The RNGs are charac-
terised by an appropriate measure of the experimenters’
free will in choosing their measurements, also known as
measurement independence, though here we will use the
term measurement dependence (MD) for reasons appar-
ent in the definitions below. While there is no known
way to experimentally determine this value, it remains
important to understand, for a prescribed degree of MD,
how much advantage can be gained by an adversary (or
was gained previously), or how to exclude such influ-
ences. The latter question has recently been addressed
in the form of randomness amplification protocols [16–
18] in which a random input string with a given MD
is processed into a new random string about which any
adversary has less information. These studies have ei-
ther assumed no correlations between different runs of
the experiment [15, 19] or [16–18] restricted the proba-
bility distributions to be of a very specific form known as
a Santha-Vazirani source [20], which requires for a source
of bits zi ∈ {0, 1} that for some  > 0 and any n,
1
2 −  ≤ p(zn|λ, z1, . . . , zn−1) ≤ 12 + 
where λ encapsulates a local variable influencing the
source. Clearly, a positive lower bound on such prob-
abilities prevents the predetermined exclusion of a mea-
surement choice. Since this exclusion of a measurement
choice is intimately involved with the optimal cheating
strategy, other measures of MD could exhibit substan-
tially different behaviour. Furthermore, whilst the users
of the devices view the two RNGs as separate entities,
and the Santha-Vazirani specification is for individual
RNGs, an eavesdropper who is preprogramming this has
arbitrary access to program them as she wishes, and so
effectively considers them as one joint entity.
In this paper, we assign the experimenters a fixed de-
gree of MD in making their measurement choices, using
a measure not constrained by the Santha-Vazirani condi-
tion, and determine the maximum value that a classical
strategy could possibly achieve in the Bell test, compar-
ing that to the standard threshold of a Bell test. This has
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2previously been examined with regards to attacking sin-
gle runs of a CHSH test [13], more general Bell tests [15],
and its application to randomness expansion [19]. We
show that an eavesdropper gains an advantage by corre-
lating the partially random generation of measurement
choices over many runs of the test. Our results explic-
itly describe the optimal correlations between RNGs and
measurement devices that an adversary might introduce.
We compare this strategy to the optimal quantum strat-
egy, allowing us to prove that when there is a small (yet
non-minimal) amount of MD, a sufficiently high Bell vio-
lation will exclude the possibility of a classical correlated
attack. We outline our methods and analytic bounds for
the bipartite Bell test due to Clauser, Horne, Shimony
and Holt (CHSH) [21], and discuss other Bell tests which
are equally amenable to the same numerical analysis.
II. MEASURES OF MEASUREMENT
DEPENDENCE
The CHSH test consists of two parties, Alice and Bob,
making random choices j, k ∈ {0, 1}, corresponding to
making one of two measurements, Aj , Bk and obtaining
outcomes, aj , bk ∈ {±1}. After recording the result of
each measurement, they communicate in order to calcu-
late
〈S〉 = 〈a0b0〉+ 〈a0b1〉+ 〈a1b0〉 − 〈a1b1〉.
Assuming they have perfect RNGs, each measurement is
equally likely, and the expected value of each measure-
ment result (independent of what the other party mea-
sured) is 0. In the cryptographic scenario, Alice and Bob
are trying to use this to prove that they have a quan-
tum resource, the ideal result being 〈S〉 = 2√2, although
no value |〈S〉| > 2 can be explained by somebody en-
tirely replacing the quantum functionality of the box with
a deterministic protocol. This changes, however, if the
eavesdropper can manipulate the random measurement
choices. Nevertheless, we will constrain the eavesdropper
to strategies which, on average, cause each measurement
choice to be equally likely, and each measurement out-
come to be equally likely, otherwise Alice and Bob would
soon spot that something was going on!
We are interested in assessing the performance of an
eavesdropper when they are allowed to pre-program both
the measurement devices and the RNGs of the two par-
ties. Their collective strategy is a program, known as
a local hidden variable (LHV) model, that the eaves-
dropper designs; a random variable x ∈ X specifying
how to select the measurement bases and the correspond-
ing results. The degree of control that the eavesdropper
has over the choice of measurement basis is contained in
the probabilities of making a given choice, p(Aj , Bk|x).
Numerous different ways have been proposed to assign
a numerical value based on this [13–15, 19]. Perhaps
the most natural class of measures are those that can
be interpreted as the advantage that is gained by the
eavesdropper’s knowledge of the probability distribution
as compared to that of Alice and Bob’s:
Mp = max
x∈X
∑
j,k
|p(Aj , Bk|x)− p(Aj , Bk)|p
1/p ,
particularly for p = 1. We require that the marginal
distributions representing the measurement choices are
uniform, p(Aj , Bk) =
∑
x p(x)p(Aj , Bk|x) = 14 , as is typ-
ically the case in a CHSH test, although there may be
advantages to the cryptographers to lifting this expecta-
tion [15]. Whilst the p = 1 norm is amenable to analysis
using linear programming [22], the choice of p =∞ gen-
eralises to the multiple run case more readily and seems
natural with its prominent ties to the min-entropy mea-
sure that is useful in cryptographic scenarios. This is
seen by
lim
p→∞Mp = maxx,j,k
|p(Aj , Bk|x)− p(Aj , Bk)| = P − 1
4
,
where P is the maximum probability
P := max
j,k,x
p(Aj , Bk|x),
since the maximum is obtained for p(Aj , Bk|x) > 1/4
(this will always be true in the large run limit in the pa-
rameter regime that is interesting for operation). This
measure was introduced in [19], with P = 1 represent-
ing the possibility of an entirely deterministic selection
with no free will, and P = 14 delivering the uniform
measurement selections Alice and Bob expect to observe.
The techniques presented here can also be applied to the
measure introduced by Hall [13], subject to some minor
technical adjustments. In contrast to the previous ter-
minology, we say that these measures characterise mea-
surement dependence (rather than independence), since a
model with a higher evaluation displays measurement se-
lections that are more dependent on the underlying vari-
ables.
III. OPTIMAL ONE-SHOT ATTACK
We focus on maximising the score of a CHSH game
subject to a fixed MD P . The measurement settings
are Aj , Bk with j, k ∈ {0, 1} and the outcomes are de-
terministically specified by underlying variables x, i.e.
aj(x), bk(x) ∈ {±1}, such that the game evaluates
S = 4
∑
x
p(x)
∑
j,k∈{0,1}
p(Aj , Bk|x)(−1)jkaj(x)bk(x).
(1)
This score is related to the probability of winning a single
round of the CHSH game by pwin = (1 + S/4)/2. A
3x a0 a1 b0 b1
0 1 1 1 1
1 1 −1 1 1
2 1 1 1 −1
3 1 −1 −1 1
TABLE I: Outcomes specified by an underlying variable x
single run of the experiment is said to give a ‘correct
answer’ to the CHSH game if either (j, k) 6= (1, 1) and the
outcomes are equal, or (j, k) = (1, 1) and the outcomes
are different. From a choice of 16 distinct outcome sets,
half achieve the maximum local CHSH score, giving only
one incorrect answer for the four possible query pairs.
These are given by the four variables in Table I, along
with their conjugates that specify the negative outcomes
(these should be used half of the time to avoid suspicion
of fixed outcomes, but do not affect correlations and have
been suppressed from the calculations for simplicity).
The adversarial strategy selects each x ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}
with probability 1/4, uniquely defining a set of predeter-
mined outcomes, followed by the measurement choices
j,k to be used, represented by y = 2j + k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}
so that the conditional probabilities may be rewritten as
p(y|x), and the definition of MD as P = maxx,y p(y|x).
We seek to maximise the CHSH score (1)
S = 4− 2
∑
x+y=3
p(y|x), (2)
subject to a fixed degree of MD P and Bayes’ theorem∑
x
p(x)p(y|x) = p(y) ∀y, (3)
which reduces to
∑
x p(y|x) = 1 by the assertion that
p(x) = p(y) = 1/4. The optimal strategy has been
derived using both Hall’s measure [13, 23] and P [19].
The latter takes P ∈ [1/4, 1/3] such that p(y|x) = P if
x+ y 6= 3 (i.e. correct answer) and p(y|x) = 1− 3P oth-
erwise, yielding S = 24P − 4 up to the threshold value
P = 1/3 that achieves maximum S = 4. Optimality de-
rives directly from the reasoning outlined below for the
general case.
IV. MULTIPLE RUNS
A. Classical Adversary
Under the usual assumption of perfect measurement
independence, the best classical eavesdropping strategy
acts independently on each run of the experiment [24]. A
limited MD scenario necessitates re-investigation of the
possible types of attack, since Eve may use her extra
knowledge of the underlying system’s imperfections to
correlate her strategy appropriately. This is similar to
LHV models which exploit imperfect photon detection
rates by simulating a detection failure and changing the
output strategy accordingly [25].
Assume, as before, that Eve has written a program
that tells Alice’s and Bob’s devices what to do (using
the local measurement settings as inputs), now encoding
instructions for blocks of N runs together. If Eve seeks to
optimise the CHSH score, the outcomes for each run must
still be drawn from Table I. The N -run system is fully
characterised by the strings x,y ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}N such that
xn and yn denote respectively the outcome assignments
and pair of measurement settings for the nth run. The
definition of P intuitively extends to an N -run model
by considering all possible combinations of measurement
settings and underlying outcome specifications,
P(N) := max
x,y
p(y|x). (4)
It is clear that the optimal single-shot strategy above,
when repeated independently for N runs, has MD P(N) =
PN ∈ [4−N , 3−N ]. The optimal correlated attack will ob-
viously perform as well or better than this, and compar-
ison can be made with the repeated single-shot strategy
over varying N by taking the Nth root, thus a fixed MD
P requires that p(y|x) ≤ PN for all x,y.
The one-shot attack distinguishes which (xn, yn)-pairs
give a correct answer; the extension to N runs asks how
many answers for a pair (x,y) are correct, k(x,y) :=∑N
n=1 δxn+yn 6=3. The average CHSH score is then
S = −4 + 8
∑
x
p(x)Sx Sx :=
1
N
∑
y
p(y|x)k(x,y).
(5)
We wish to maximise S subject to p(x) = p(y) = 4−N ,
Bayes’ rule condition∑
x
p(x)p(y|x) = p(y) ∀y (6)
and the limited MD constraint p(y|x) ≤ PN for all x,y.
Sx may be rewritten as
Sx =
1
N
N∑
k=0
kpxk p
x
k :=
∑
y:k(x,y)=k
p(y|x).
Since p(y|x) can be individually varied, the optimisa-
tion can be made on each Sx separately. The outcome
specifications obtained from extending Table I to N runs
exhibit the following relation for any k,x,x′:
#{y : k(x,y) = k} = #{y : k(x′,y) = k} =
(
N
k
)
3k.
Thus, redistribution of the probabilities p(y|x) over any
y for which k(x,y) = k will have no effect on the max-
imisation. Optimisation of S corresponds to independent
optimisation over each of the Sx. Since these quantities
4are the same for all x,x′, it is evident that they have
the same optimum, pxk = p
x′
k , so we may remove the x
dependence, defining pk such that p
x
k = pk
(
N
k
)
3k, thus
(5) becomes
S =
8
N
N∑
k=0
kpk3
k
(
N
k
)
− 4. (7)
The probabilities are also subject to Bayes’ rule, condi-
tion (6) which, by the assertion that p(x) = p(y) = 4−N ,
reduces to
N∑
k=0
pk3
k
(
N
k
)
= 1, (8)
whilst fixed MD P requires that pk ≤ PN for all k. This
problem can be solved by linear programming, which con-
firms the following argument.
Intuitively for a CHSH test, obtaining the maximum
S value requires more weight to be given to the pairs of
measurement settings that answer a larger proportion of
the N queries correctly. Therefore we assign pN = P
N .
If the normalisation (8) allows, set pN−1 = PN , and so
on. All remaining pk are set to 0. The curve of maximum
S against PN is piecewise linear, connected by the N +1
points defined by a parameter l′ such that
P =
(
N∑
k=l′
3k
(
N
k
))−1/N
, (9)
S =
8PN
N
N∑
k=l′
k3k
(
N
k
)
− 4. (10)
The curve is linearly interpolated for PN , where P ∈
[1/4, 1/3], between these points by assigning pk = 0 for
k < l′ − 1, pk = PN for k ≥ l′, and letting pl′−1 ful-
fil the normalisation (8). Figure 1 shows such plots for
various finite values of N . We see immediately that the
eavesdropper gains an advantage with increasing N , out-
performing the single-shot attack. For certain sequences
of measurement choices in the optimal strategy, such as
those that have already given N − l′ wrong answers, the
impossibility of certain measurement choices is perfectly
predictable. Nevertheless, knowledge of the hidden vari-
able x makes knowledge of previous measurement choices
irrelevant to the cheating strategy.
The optimal strategy’s behaviour in the large N limit
is less clear. Is the limiting curve simply the S = 4 line,
making perfect measurement independence the singular
point at which the CHSH test functions? The following
theorem answers this in the negative.
Theorem 1. The measurement dependence P required to
simulate a CHSH score S with a deterministic strategy
correlated over N runs, in the N → ∞ limit, has the
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FIG. 1: The maximal CHSH expectation value S for given
MD parameter P with varying numbers of runs N across
which measurement basis choices are correlated. Strategies
are classical (solid lines) or quantum (dashed lines). The black
lines are the correlated strategies in the limit N →∞, there-
fore upper bounds for all finite N -run strategies. The shaded
region indicates achievable CHSH violations using quantum
technology and perfect measurement independence.
lower bound
P ≥
(
4 + S
24
) 4+S
8
(
4− S
8
) 4−S
8
. (11)
Proof. It is enough to consider the N + 1 points defined
by (9) and (10) and find lower/upper bounds for P/S
respectively as functions of the rescaled parameter l =
l′/N ∈ [3/4, 1]. To bound P , observe that P = 14 Pr(X ≥
l′)−1/N where X is a binomial distribution with N trials
and success probability 3/4. The additive form of the
Chernoff bound easily recovers
P ≥ (l/3)l(1− l)1−l. (12)
We aim to bound S by dividing the region k = l′ . . . N
into two runs, split at αN , such that
R1 :=
αN−1∑
k=l′
3k
(
N
k
)
≥ 3lN
(
N
lN
)
≥ 3lNeNH(l),
R2 :=
N∑
αN
3k
(
N
k
)
≤ 4Ne−ND(α‖ 34 ),
where we have used Stirling’s approximation and a Cher-
noff bound respectively. H(l) = −l log2 l−(1−l) log2(1−
l) is the binary entropy while
D(α‖β) = α ln
(
α
β
)
+ (1− α) ln
(
1− α
1− β
)
is the Kullback-Leibler divergence between Bernoulli dis-
tributed random variables with parameters α and β. For
any α = l +  with finite (but small) ,
R2
R1
≤ 4
Ne−ND(α‖
3
4 )
3lNeNH(l)
5is exponentially small in N . For increasing R2R1 ,
S ≤ 8αR1 +R2
R1 +R2
− 4
is increasing. In the large N limit this yields
S ≤ 8(l + )− 4. (13)
The bound is tight since a lower bound for (10) is given
by
S ≥ 8P
N l′
N
N∑
k=l′
3k
(
N
k
)
− 4 = 8l − 4, (14)
substituting the definition of P in (9). Substitution for l
in the bounds (12) and (13) yields the result.
The bound may alternatively be expressed in terms of
the CHSH winning probability pwin as
P ≥
(pwin
3
)pwin
(1− pwin)1−pwin . (15)
The regime of allowable correlated LHV attacks de-
scribed by Theorem 1 is depicted by the solid lines in
Figure 1. The points P∞ ≈ 0.258 and P1 ≈ 0.285 are
where a CHSH value of S = 2
√
2 can be achieved with
(infinitely) correlated strategies and single shot attacks
respectively. In the shaded region (for P < P∞), the S
values are below 2
√
2 and therefore achievable with quan-
tum technologies, and yet can never be simulated by any
arbitrarily correlated attack without detection from Alice
and Bob in their observed measurement choices.
B. Quantum adversary
Tsirelson’s bound proves that a test of the CHSH in-
equality with perfect measurement independence has a
maximum possible value of 2
√
2, for instance when the
experimenters perform quantum measurements on a sin-
glet state [26]. Such quantum strategies are known to
be vulnerable to a limited-free-will attack in the single
shot case by optimising over both the measurement input
distribution and the measurement operators themselves
[19]. Further correlating over N runs of the experiment
can also enhance this quantum strategy.
We make the common assumption that each run is
causally disconnected [27, 28], which ensures that the
measurement choices for each CHSH test, given knowl-
edge of the hidden variable, are otherwise independent,
i.e. measurement choices at distant locations are not
known beyond the extent to which it is implied by knowl-
edge of the hidden variable. The causal independence
also enforces that the effective CHSH operator being op-
timised has the local form
SN := S ⊗ 1⊗ 1 . . .+ 1⊗S ⊗ 1 . . .+ 1⊗ 1⊗S . . .+ . . . .
Alice and Bob can only perform local measurements, thus
use of an entangled state between the devices over mul-
tiple runs does not provide an advantage. The state that
optimises this operator is separable, corresponding to a
tensor product of the states that optimise 〈S〉 in (16),
such that |〈SN 〉| = N |〈S〉|, so it is enough to optimise
over the single-shot operator S.
For a specified value of P , determining the optimal
quantum strategy (which will typically correspond to no
eavesdropping) will yield the maximum realisable CHSH
value, which is important in bounding an eavesdropper’s
knowledge for a given CHSH value.
Using the notation py for the probabilities of a given
set of N measurement settings described by a string y ∈
{0, 1, 2, 3}N , the aim is to maximise the expectation
〈S〉 = 4
N
N∑
n=1
〈pn0A0B0 + pn1A0B1 + pn2A1B0 − pn3A1B1〉
(16)
where, by our causality assumption, pnm =
∑
y:yn=m
py
are the marginal probabilities for a given setting m being
chosen on run n, and the measurement operators Aj and
Bk are two-valued operators. Bounds on 〈S〉 subject to
fixed P have been derived for an individual run in [19].
Using the same symmetry arguments as above, we reduce
the set {py} to {pk} according to the number of correct
answers each set y gives. This leaves pn0 = p
n
1 = p
n
2 = R
and pn3 = 1 − 3R where, through the symmetry-based
reduction, R is simply
R =
N∑
k=1
3k−1
k
N
(
N
k
)
pk
which is equivalent to (7) up to constant factors. There-
fore, for a fixed degree of MD requiring pk ≤ PN ∀k, R
is optimised by the same input distribution (see Eq. (9)).
The achievable expectation values are then
|〈S〉| ≤ 4(1− 2R)
3/2
√
1− 3R ,
provided R < 3/10 [19]. This maximal value SQ can be
compared with the value SC = 4(6R−1) obtained by the
optimal classical, deterministic strategy as
SQ =
2(8− SC)3/2
3
√
6(4− SC)
(17)
when SC < 16/5. For R ≥ 3/10, hence SC ≥ 16/5,
the two strategies coincide. The quantum strategies are
compared with their classical equivalents in Figure 1.
V. NUMERICAL APPROACH TO OTHER BELL
INEQUALITIES
The analytical results for correlated strategies to the
CHSH test above are not easily replicable for more com-
plex Bell tests, since there are complications when a Bell
6test does not require the correlations produced by every
possible measurement pair to evaluate the score. Never-
theless, as alluded to in the definitions, optimal finite N -
run strategies can be determined numerically for a given
measure of MD using linear programming. We briefly
outline the approach for the measure M1 (since P is sim-
pler), for both the CHSH test and its well-known gener-
alisation to the class of m setting, 2 outcome tests, Imm22
[29].
For the CHSH test, the aim is to maximise S as
in (7) subject to normalisation (8) and fixed MD M1.
By assuming p(x) = 4−N , the normalisation ensures∑
x p(y|x) = 1 for each y, whilst M1 is given by
M1 = max
x
Mx Mx :=
∑
y
∣∣∣∣p(y|x)− 14N
∣∣∣∣ (18)
We may again reduce the conditional probabilities to the
N + 1-element vector p = (pk) by considering the follow-
ing symmetry argument. Observe that to maximise S for
fixed M1, all the Sx will be equal, which in turn means
that all Mx will be equal. (18) reduces to
M1 =
N∑
k=0
(
N
k
)
3k
∣∣∣∣pk − 14N
∣∣∣∣ . (19)
Introducing new non-negative variables w such that
wk ≥ pk − 4−N , wk ≥ 4−N − pk (20)
allows removal of the modulus to create a standard lin-
ear programming problem by converting all inequalities
to a statement on non-negative variables, i.e. introduce
variables a, b defined by ak := wk − pk + 4−N and
bk := wk + pk − 4−N and set a ≥ 0, b ≥ 0 to represent
(20). The measurement independence condition (19) is
then expressed as
M1 =
N∑
k=0
(
N
k
)
3kwk. (21)
We have now reduced to the linear problem
minimize c · z
subject to B · z = v, z ≥ 0
where z is a 4(N+1)-element vector with the block struc-
ture zT = ( p w a b ) and cT = ( −s 0 0 0 ), where
sk := 3
k
(
N−1
k−1
)
, is used to maximise S = −4− 8c ·z. The
normalisation constraint, the definitions of a and b and
the measurement independence constraint (21) are found
within
B =

n 0 0 0
1 −1 1 0
−1 −1 0 1
0 n 0 0
 , v =

1
4−N
−4−N
1
N1
MK

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FIG. 2: Comparison of the optimal correlated attack (solid
line) with N repetitions of the optimal one-shot attack
(dashed line) for N = 100, using the CHSH inequality. The
maximum score S = 4 can be simulated classically with a
measurement dependence of M1 = Mmax := 2(1− (3/4)N ).
where nk :=
(
N
k
)
3k.
The optimal single-shot attack (N = 1) under the mea-
sure M1 is in fact the same model as before with param-
eter P ∈ [1/4, 1/3], where M1 = 3(P − 1/4) and thus
S = 2 + 8M1. We compare the optimal correlated N -
run attack with N repetitions of the one-shot attack. As
with the analysis for P , both strategies coincide at the
limits S = 2 and S = 4, the latter being achieved with
MD of Mmax(N) := 2(1− (3/4)N ), again with pN = 3−N
and otherwise pk = 0. The comparison for N = 100 is
shown in Figure 2. Unfortunately, the complexity of the
M1 measure compared to P makes the derivation of a
general bound for all N difficult.
In principle, any Bell test (linear function of the un-
derlying probability distribution) can be expressed in this
way. The family of Imm22 Bell tests [29], which are two
party, m setting, two outcome (±1) tests, benefit from
a similar symmetry reduction to that of the CHSH test,
corresponding to m = 2. As an extension of (1), these
tests can similarly be assigned a score
Smm22 = m
2
∑
x
p(x)
m−1∑
j,k=0
p(Aj , Bk|x)αmjkaj(x)bk(x)
(22)
where αmjk takes the value +1 if j+k < m, −1 if j+k = m
and 0 if j + k > m.
There are additional complications for m ≥ 3, how-
ever. Firstly, not every pair of correlations is assigned
the same weight; some pairs are not used at all, i.e. (j, k)
for which αmjk = 0. Nevertheless, an eavesdropper needs
to ensure that such correlations still arise so as not to be
suspicious. This means that, upon enumerating the mea-
surement settings with strings y ∈ {0, . . . ,m2− 1}N and
determining the optimal outcome sets x, the symmetry
structure of p(y|x) has two parameters – k, the number
of ‘correct’ answers (as before) to correlation pairs that
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FIG. 3: Comparison of the optimal correlated attack (solid
line) with N repetitions of the optimal one-shot attack
(dashed line) for N = 10, using the I3322 inequality. The
maximum score S3322 = 8 can be simulated classically with a
measurement dependence of M1 = Mmax := 2(1− (7/9)N ).
are used, and l, the number of unused correlation pairs
in the string y. Hence, we have a set of probabilities
{pk,l} to optimise over. However, this also means that
the constraints (3) only reduce to a set of N + 1 con-
ditions dependent on how many unused correlation pairs
are present for given settings y rather than a single condi-
tion, and depending on the choice of distribution p(x), it
may never be possible to satisfy all these conditions. Nev-
ertheless, this choice does not affect optimality; provided
a distribution of p(x) is selected such that the constraints
(3) are all fulfilled, that is equally as good as any other
satisfying assignment, and the same optimal values can
be achieved. Figure 3 shows a comparative plot for the
I3322 inequality in which an advantage to the correlated
attack is found.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
By manipulating the RNGs used to select measure-
ments in a Bell test in tandem with the devices perform-
ing them, an adversary may simulate a Bell violation.
The degree of violation can be bounded above in terms
of an appropriate measure of MD. Crucially, whilst the
adversary gains a significant advantage in employing at-
tacks correlated over many runs of an experiment, as
opposed to single-shot attacks, there are still violations
which cannot be reproduced by such attacks if the ex-
perimenters’ degree of MD is sufficiently low. In light of
this, existing analyses of the working regimes for device-
independent randomness expansion [19] and key distri-
bution protocols could be revised, although the problem
of performing privacy amplification without trusted ran-
domness would need addressing. Since many of these
utilise the CHSH test, our focus on this test is imme-
diately applicable, while application to other tests is a
simple linear programming problem. How to experimen-
tally assess the value of P (or another measure) in a pair
of RNGs remains an open question.
While our analysis does not require the RNGs to be
Santha-Vazirani sources [20], as in proposed randomness
amplification protocols [16–18], our results can be inter-
preted in the context of randomness amplification. For a
given MD P , the optimal quantum strategy, in the regime
where quantum beats classical (i.e. SC < 16/5), gives
perfectly random measurement outcomes on one side. If
the players could know the value of the hidden variable in
a run, and therefore the measurement selection bias, they
can implement the optimal quantum strategy, which has
the potential to allow perfect amplification (i.e. procur-
ing perfectly random bits from partially random bits) in
this regime. However, there is no obvious reason why
honest players would have such knowledge of the hidden
variables.
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